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ABSTRACT
The Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is increasing in popularity as a cost
effective and efficient means of making telephone calls via the Internet.
However, VoIP may also be an attractive method of communication to
criminals as their true identity may be hidden and voice and video
communications are encrypted as they are deployed across the Internet. This
produces a new set of challenges for forensic analysts compared with
traditional wire-tapping of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
infrastructure, which is not applicable to VoIP. Therefore, other methods of
recovering electronic evidence from VoIP are required. This research
investigates the analysis and recovery of digitised human voice, which persists
in computer memory after a VoIP call.
This paper outlines the ongoing development of a software tool, the purpose
of which, determines how remnants of digitised human speech from a VoIP
call may be identified within a forensic memory capture based on how the
human voice is detected via a microphone and encoded to a digital format
using the sound card of a personal computer. This digital format is
unencrypted whist stored in Random Access Memory (RAM) before it is
passed to the VoIP application for encryption and transmission over the
Internet. Similarly, an incoming encrypted VoIP call is decrypted by the VoIP
application and passes through RAM unencrypted in order to be played via the
speaker output.
A series of controlled tests were undertaken whereby RAM captures were
analysed for remnants of digital audio after a VoIP audio call with known
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conversation. The identification and analysis of digital audio from RAM
attempts to construct an automatic process for the identification and
subsequent reconstruction of the audio content of a VoIP call.
This research focuses on the analysis of RAM captures acquired using XWays Forensics software. This research topic, guided by a Law Enforcement
Agency, uses X-Ways Forensics to simulate a RAM capture which is achieved
covertly on a target machine without the user's knowledge, via the Internet,
during or after a VoIP call has taken place. The authors assume no knowledge
of the technique implemented to recover the covert RAM capture and are
asked to base their analysis on a memory capture supplied in the format of a
file with a ‘.txt’ extension. The methods of analysis described herein are
independent of the acquisition method applied to RAM capture.
The goal of this research is to develop automated software that may be applied
to a RAM capture to identify fragments of audio persisting in RAM after a
VoIP call has been terminated, using time domain and signal processing
technique, frequency domain analysis. Once individual segments of audio
have been identified, the feasibility of reproducing audio from a VoIP call
may be determined.
Keywords:
Computer forensics, digital evidence, electronic evidence,
Voice over Internet Protocol, VoIP, Random Access Memory, RAM, Fast
Fourier Transform, Frequency Domain analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Voice over Internet Protocol technology, called VoIP, is an attractive
alternative to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) which may be
appealing to criminals, because of (1) VoIP being a global telephony service,
in which it is difficult to verify the user’s personal identification (2), the
security of placing such calls, as many implementations use strong encryption
to secure both the voice payload and control messages, and (3) monitoring or
tracing such VoIP calls being difficult since conventional methods such as
wire-tapping are not applicable to VoIP calls. Therefore, other methods of
recovering evidence and information from voice over IP protocol are required.
It is essential that forensic computing researchers devise methods to allow law
enforcement agencies to overcome some of the aspects of this method of
telephony that are advantageous to criminals.
This research aims to develop automated software that may be applied to a
RAM capture to identify fragments of audio persisting in RAM after a VoIP
call has been terminated. An algorithm searches the RAM capture to identify
audio like samples displaying a symmetrical pattern similar to human voice.
Digital signal processing techniques are then applied to the suspected audio
fragments for analysis in the frequency domain looking at the power spectrum
of each sample. An introduction to digital signal processing techniques for
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forensic investigators is briefly discussed in section 3.
Voice over Internet Protocol Stack
This introduction provides an overview of the VoIP related protocols for the
reader unfamiliar with this technology. VoIP is not a single protocol in itself
but rather a collection of a number of co-existing protocols for the
encapsulation and transport of voice packets over the Internet, referred to as
the protocol stack.
The Internet Protocol (IP) (Postel, 1981) is responsible for providing the
internet addresses in its internet header allowing packets to be routed from
their source to a destination IP address. The IP header format is shown in
Figure1.

Figure 1 – IP packet header format
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) (Postel, 1980) is an unreliable transport
protocol because it does not guarantee delivery of packets. However, due to its
simplicity and ability to transmit packets immediately after they have been
created, UDP is well suited to the requirements of VoIP. A single packet may
be measured in the order of 10s of milliseconds of audio and the human ear
will not be able to detect the loss of packets until the threshold of human
audibility is reached, an order of several 100 milliseconds. The UDP header
format is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – IP/UDP stack showing the UDP packet header format
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The research undertaken in this paper involves a series of experiments using
the VoIP application Skype (2009) which makes use of the above mentioned
protocols for Internet audio communications. To understand how human audio
is converted to a packetised digital format contained within the payload of the
IP packet, we briefly outline the common techniques employed in pulse code
modulation (PCM). PCM is the technique whereby a digital value is assigned
to the analogue value of a short sample of human audio.
1.2 Pulse Code Modulation
PCM is a technique used to digitally represent sampled analogue signals, to
produce digital audio in computers and digital telephone systems. The
frequency at which the analogue signal is sampled is termed the sampling rate,
the number of times per second that a sample is taken. The quality of the
sampled audio is determined by the sampling rate and the number of bits
assigned to represent the digitised sample. The higher the number of bits the
greater the accuracy of the digital representation of the analogue signal, often
referred to as the bit-depth.
Figure 3 demonstrates the digital representation of an analogue signal, in
which the magnitude of the analogue signal is sampled regularly at uniform
intervals, with each sample being assigned to the nearest value within a range
of digital steps, referred to as quantisation.
Bits

Time

Figure 3 – 4-bit quantisation of an analogue signal
The original analogue signal, in this instance a sinusoid, depicted as the red
curve, is sampled at regular intervals in time. The corresponding value for the
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4-bit PCM quantisation is determined by using an imaginary vertical line on
the time axis until it intersects the sinusoid and reading the digital value
pointed at on the 'bits' axis with an imaginary horizontal line. The PCM value
for the sample shown in the figure is '1101'.
A technique called companding, commonly deployed in digital telephony
systems is the act of applying compression to the analogue input signal before
passing through the analogue-to-digital converter. Figure 4a shows an
analogue signal prior to compression whereas Figure 4b shows the
compressed signal.
After compression, the analogue signal is digitised for transmission in a
suitable format for VoIP applications. After the signal is transmitted across the
Internet and received at the destination, it needs to be expanded to its original
form.
The
International
Telecommunication
Union
Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (ITU-T) proposed recommendations on speech coding
to standardise interoperability between telecommunications carriers resulted in
the G.711 codec (ITU-T G7.11, 1972), which defines two main compression
algorithms, A-law (Europe) and µ-law (U.S.A.). The choice of codec will be
determined by the VoIP application if it is proprietary or may be chosen by
the user from a list.

original signal
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
-2E-16
-0.2 0
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Figure 4a – Original signal
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A-law compressed
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Figure 4b – After compressing
1.3 Defining Digital Forensics
Digital forensics as d e f i n e d b y Beebe, Clark, Deitrich, Ko and Ko (2011)
i s the extraction of data from digital devices (e.g. personal computers,
mobile phones, digital cameras, networking devices, web/file/email servers
etc.) to reconstruct events, confirm or refute allegations of criminal activities
and/or obtain intelligence information. Additionally, Yasinsac and Manzano
(2001) define the digital forensic domain stating that digital forensics
involves the analysis of electronic devices for the purpose of discovery and
retrieval of information regarding the criminal use of technology.
Within Australia, McKemmish (1999) defines digital forensic investigations
with the use of a four-phase model to describe digital forensic investigations is
widely cited and considered seminal research within the domain of digital
forensics. The phases are defined as the Identification, Preservation, Analysis
and Presentation (IPAP) of digital evidence.
The results of activities performed upon digital evidence in order to retrieve
information must be legally acceptable f or court proceedings. The legal
requirements of digital forensics defined by Civie and Civie (1998) states:
‘The pursuit of knowledge by uncovering elemental evidence
extracted from a computer in a manner suitable for court
proceedings.‛
Therefore the combination of both legal and technical requirements is required
to demonstrate in court proceedings the phases of the digital forensics
investigation, analysis and results in a manner acceptable in a court of law.
Carrier (2003) introduces a scientific approach to the definition of digital
forensics methods stating:
‘The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward
the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis,
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interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence
derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or
furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or
helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to
planned operations.‛
To this end, the research and development of the software tool described
herein for the analysis and recovery of fragmented audio from a VoIP call
cannot be referred to as ‘forensic’ based on the definitions above at this time.
However, this paper will outline the achievements and worthiness of this
software tool so far and its suitability as a tool to assist forensic investigators
in the analysis of captured memory.
1.4 Memory Acquisition
Traditional forensics memory capture takes place whilst the forensic
investigator is on-site, and performs the physical memory capture from the
target machine to the investigator’s destination disk/image file system. The
difference between ‘dead’ and ‘live’ acquisition is described below.
 Dead Acquisition
–

Occurs when the data from a suspect system is copied
without the assistance of the suspect operating system.

–

Historically, the term ‘dead’ refers to the state of only
the operating system, so a dead acquisition can use the
hardware from the suspect system as long as it is booted
from a trusted CD or floppy.

 Live Acquisition
–

Where the suspect operating system is still running and
being used to copy data.

–

Acquisition tool needs to be able to access ‘open’ files
(files in use)

–

Beneficial in circumstances where an encrypted data
volume is mounted
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–

On a compromised system, there is the risk that the
attacker has modified the operating system or other
software to provide false data during acquisition.

Imaging a computer's hard disk can be a lengthy process. During the
acquisition process, if the forensic investigator saves the data to a file, he/she
will have the choice of what format the image will be e.g.


A raw image contains only the data from the source device. Easy
to compare the image with the source data.



An embedded image contains data from the source device and
additional descriptive data about the acquisition. User inputted
data, hash values, dates & times



Some tools will create a raw image and save the additional
descriptive data to a separate file.

As most forensic tools support raw images, the raw image it is the most
flexible format. A freely available utility for most operating systems called
‘dd’ (The Open Group, 2010) can make exact copies of memory that are
suitable for forensic analysis without the need to own commercial forensic
software packages.
1.5 Why RAM Acquisition?
Digital forensics tools play a vital role in reliably extracting information for
analysis and presentation for industrial or legal purposes. These tools are
typically used to investigate computer crimes, by identifying evidence that can
be of probative value in a court of law. Digital forensics tools are rapidly
becoming a substantial part of investigations all over the world, in both the
law enforcement and private sector domains (Hibishi, Vidor, & Cranor, 2011).
Efficient examination of digital evidence would not be possible without the
use of digital forensic tools. While an understanding of the scientifically
derived processes and the volatility of digital evidence is required by analysis
teams and technicians, it is not feasible to interpret the volumes of evidence
required for investigation on a given case manually. Both expert witnesses
and digital forensic practitioners are reliant on a set of tools for interpreting
digital evidence and to help bridge the gap of understanding between the
technical details of digital technologies and the evidence presented to a jury
in court (Schatz, 2007). Due to the vast and complex variety of devices
required for analysis by digital forensics teams, there exist many different
tools suited to handling each. These tools perform different roles including
acquisition, examination and analysis.
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The use of RAM captures is more easily explained in terms of the increasing
sources of digital evidence complexity and the technological advancements in
the volume size of storage media. Digital evidence complexity, the vast array
of different digital evidence sources, each with their own ways of storing data
and retrieving data increases the difficulty of forensic investigation. Similarly
the volume of digital evidence, i.e. the amount of digital evidence required
for practitioners of digital forensics to preserve, analyse and present in a
given case is increasing exponentially. It is both a difficult and time
consuming process to search and comprehend large quantities of digital
evidence. These issues are supported by key researchers within the domain as
pertinent issues for study (Casey, Gordon, & Leeson, 2005; Mohay, 2005).
This may impact court proceedings due to increased case backlogs and the
inability for digital forensic investigation teams to complete cases in a
reasonable period.
The current tools and techniques used to analyse digital evidence are not
scaling and adapting to the increased data volume or complex array of devices
now required for analysis with manual analysis remaining commonplace
throughout the digital forensics industry.
The Windows Forensics Analysis Tool Kit (Carvey, 2007) discusses remote
response methodology, whereby a series of commands may be executed
against a system across a network using a Windows batch file comprising the
name or IP address of the target system and the username/password logon
credentials. The batch file contains executable code, which can be copied to
and run on the target system with the corresponding output saved in a file on
the target machine. The only limitation to perform analysis of the target
machine is the ability to remotely login to the target system via the network.
This research introduces novel techniques and approaches with respect to the
analysis of captured memory, required to address the key issues above
resulting in Law Enforcement choosing ‘live’ RAM capture to minimise the
complexity and volume of data to be analysed.
1.6 X-Ways Forensics
This focus of this research is on the analysis of the contents of RAM captures
and as such it does not investigate memory acquisition techniques. No Law
Enforcement Agency supplied RAM captures from a target machine, thus
requiring the researchers to simulate a RAM capture, using X-Ways
Forensics, computer forensics software, as shown in Figure 5.
The option exists to capture an individual running process and the RAM
allocated to that process e.g. VoIP application Skype, expanded in Figure 5b.
However, to maintain the same conditions for each capture, the entire physical
memory is captured, as show in Figure 5a.
The X Ways Forensics RAM editor allows one to examine the physical
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RAM/main memory and the logical memory of a process (i.e. a program that
is being executed) where all memory pages committed to a process are
presented in a continuous block. If one selects one of the listed processes, one
may access either the so-called primary memory or the entire memory of this
process, or one of the loaded modules.
The primary memory is used by programs for nearly all purposes. Usually it
also contains the main module of a process (the EXE file), the stack; and the
heap. The “entire memory” contains the whole logical memory of a process
including the part of memory that is shared among all processes, except
system modules.

Figure 5a – Entire RAM physical memory.
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Figure 5b – Individual RAM processes e.g. Skype
When one opens the local physical RAM, processes will be listed in the
directory browser, even hidden processes, with their timestamps and process
IDs, and their own respective memory address spaces can be individually
viewed with pages concatenated in correct logical order as seen by each
process.
The purpose of this research is not to use the powerful capability of the XWays Forensics RAM editor to reverse engineer captures and identify running
processes, shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6– Byte offsets within a RAM capture for modules and objects.
2 METHODOLOGY & EXPERIMENTS
This research approach draws on the strengths of both quantitative and
qualitative research approaches. This research focuses on outcomes that are of
practical use, the creation of knowledge that advances digital forensics based
on tangible and measurable results. This research strives for objectivity and
measurability via controlled experiments using algorithms developed to
pattern recognise human speech.
2.1 Baseline Experiments
X-Ways Forensics software was installed on the target Windows XP virtual
machine initiating the VoIP call, and the capture taken after the VoIP call was
terminated and the VoIP application closed down. The amount of RAM
captured is 512MB. However, to reduce the possibility of false positives,
identifying suspect audio fragments, which in fact are not audio and false
negatives, failing to identify audio which is indeed fragments of suspect
audio, the experiment shown in Table 1 was implemented.
Table 1 – Initial results from RAM capture analysis.
RAM
Capture
1
2
3

Detection Method

Expected outcome

Visual inspection
Visual inspection
Visual inspection

No audio
No audio
No audio

66

Actual
outcome
Sinusoids
Sinusoids
Sinusoids

Byte
size
4096
4096
4096

Segments
24
24
24
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The initial analysis technique involved displaying the byte values of RAM
graphically, and visually inspecting the RAM contents. This is a time
consuming process but produced some unexpected results. No audio was
introduced to the system, however, a sinusoidal pattern with an amplitude
offset was detected, in all three RAM captures tested and was repeatable. The
authors believe this to be the Windows XP sound that is played at system start
up shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 – Windows XP signature audio at start up.
The audio segments found resembled those shown in Figure 8b whereas
Figure 8a displays the similar sinusoid with no amplitude offset. This initial
technique of creating baseline knowledge of the RAM contents before
introducing known audio fragments and a VoIP call is essential.
Direct current voltage (dc) is an electronics term to identify an offsetting of a
signal from zero. This offset may be implemented in hardware such as a sound
card.
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Sinusoidal signal
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Figure 8a – A sinusoidal signal.

Sinusoidal signal - dc offset
6
4
2
0
0

2000

4000

6000

-2
-4
-6

Figure 8b – A sinusoidal signal with amplitude offset.
2.1 Introduce Known Audio
The next round of experiments involved introducing a known audio pattern
into the RAM contents, still without the introduction of a VoIP call at this
time. The audio signal has been selected from the TIMIT Corpus (Garofolo,
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Lamel, Fisher, Fiscus, Pallett, Dahlgren, & Zue, 1993) which provides speech
data for acoustic phonetic studies. These are 16-bit, 16 KHz time aligned
speech waveforms i.e. the byte locations within the waveform have been
identified for each uttered word and the phonemes that constitute that word.
The chosen phonetic sentence known as ‘LDC93S1W’ is single channel PCM.
Five samples of audio extracted from the phonetic sentence, each 3000 bytes
in size, were randomly inserted into a RAM capture using X-Ways hex editor.
An example of one segment of the known audio is shown in Figure 9.

Symmetrical nature of human voice
800
600
400
200
0
-200

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

-400
-600
-800

Figure 9 – An audio extract from the known phonetic sentence inserted into
RAM.
This experiment was repeated three times, each with a different ordering of
the known audio and its location within the RAM capture. The results are
shown in Table 2.
Table 2 – The insertion of known audio pattern into RAM captures.
RAM
Capture

Detection
Method

1

Automatic
algorithm
Automatic
algorithm
Automatic
algorithm

2
3

Known
audio
sequence
ABCDE

Expected
outcome

Actual
outcome

Byte
size

Segments

audio

ABCDE

3000

5

CAEBD

audio

CAEBD

3000

5

DCEAB

audio

DCEAB

3000

5

This set of experiments involved the detection of known audio segments
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implanted into the RAM capture to test and develop an algorithm that detects
the features of human audio. The inserted audio segments were all detected in
the order in which they were inserted into the RAM capture.
2.2 Introduce VoIP Call
The following experiments consisted of using VoIP application Skype to make
a VoIP call to the Skype sound test service. The call was then terminated and a
RAM capture performed on the computer initiating the VoIP call using XWays Forensics (2009). This was then repeated after the lapse of a 24-hour
period whereby the laptop on which the RAM capture was performed, was
powered down to allow the RAM contents to dissipate.
Audio analysis tool, ESection (2010) was also used as the basis for the starting
point in audio signal identification whilst performing VoIP calls. The VoIP
calls were initiated and the RAM captured from inside a virtual machine (VM)
using VMware (2009). The amount of RAM that is subsequently captured and
analysed in the VM may be reduced The ESection software is operated
externally to the virtual machine whilst running on the host machine
supporting the virtual machine. This prevents the identification of audio
within the RAM capture inside the virtual machine from being confused with
the audio input at the microphone captured using ESection. Therefore all
ESection audio captures saved on the host do not appear in the VM RAM
capture
The ESection capture allows us to further develop an algorithm based on the
properties of the captured audio, magnitude and symmetry to identify the type
of signal that should be searched for within the VM RAM capture as shown
below in Figure 10.

16-bit Sinusoidal signal
10000
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0
0

200

400

600

800

1000

-5000
-10000

Figure 10 – Initial signed sinusoidal signal (x-axis: No. of samples, y-axis:
Amplitude)
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Several of the sinusoidal-like signals observed are believed to form part of the
VoIP application dialling tones and not human speech. This is later confirmed
by frequency domain analysis in Section 3.
The ESection capture allows us to develop an algorithm based on the
properties of the captured audio, magnitude and symmetry to identify the type
of signal that should be searched for within the VM RAM capture as shown
below in Figure 11.

Figure 11 – ESection audio capture (x-axis: No. of samples, y-axis: Amplitude)
This allows one to focus on the specific attributes of human speech within the
ESection captured signal in order to implement an algorithm which can
automatically search a block of computer memory. By close inspection of the
properties of captured human speech such as changes in amplitude and
symmetry, one can construct an algorithm that will exclude signals which do
not show the typical attributes of digitised human speech such as symmetry
and repetition of the waveform.
The use of virtual machines allows a much smaller amount of virtual RAM to
be captured e.g. 512MB as opposed to the order of Giga bytes. This may
decrease the amount of human speech captured from the VoIP call but the
purpose of this research is to demonstrate that suspected audio fragments may
be human speech identified from analysis of a memory capture. The
individual components of identified audio tend to be typically 4096 bytes in
length and as such will require a sequence of these audio fragments to be
reconstructed to form one continuous piece of human speech to form playable
audio.
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Suspected audio samples of digitised human speech are fragmented throughout
the physical memory due to virtual address translation by the operating system
shown below in Figure 12. The virtual address pages are linked to a page table
entry (PTE) highlighted by the dashed line. The PTE contains the mapping
from the virtual address to the physical address. This diagram highlights how
three consecutive virtual pages of digitised human speech are mapped to three
non-consecutive pages in the physical memory (Solomon & Russinovich,
2005).

Figure 12 – x86 Virtual address translation
2.3 X-Ways Analysis
The virtual machine consisted of a Windows XP operating system with the
Skype VoIP application downloaded within it. A VoIP call to the Skype sound
Test Service was made then the call was terminated. X-Ways forensic
software, installed within the virtual machine, was used to capture the 512MB
of RAM. Whilst the call was being made, ESection audio capture software
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was also started on the host to record the audio input.
This experimental setup allowed for the search of RAM as outlined above, in
addition to this, the RAM was opened in the X-Ways hexadecimal editor and
specific keywords were searched for e.g. Sound Test Service. Figure 13a
shows an extract from the hexadecimal editor for search string ‘sound test
service’, providing 237 hits.

Figure 13a – X-Ways search hit for 'sound test service'
The bytes immediately following the ‘sound test service’ string were plotted
and produced an audio signal extract as shown in Figure 13b.

Figure 13b – 4096 bytes immediately following search string (x-axis: No. of
samples, y-axis: Amplitude)
Using known Skype caller id as a search string also allows the call
information attributed to the VoIP call to be extracted as shown below in
Figure 13c, such as the caller identities in raw xml format, call initiator and
timestamps. This is using X-Ways hex editor to view the captured RAM and
perform string searches. Not only does the software tool search for audio
fragments, it can retrieve information related to the VoIP call.
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“RT INTO Messages
(id,is_permanent,convo_id,chatname,author,from_dispname,gu
id,dialog_partner,timestamp,type,sending_status,body_xml,i
dentities,reason,participant_count,chatmsg_type,chatmsg_st
atus,body_is_rawxml,pk_id,call_guid)
VALUES

(164,0,30,'#david_t_irwin/$echo123;b4f208bd4c2c737c',
'david_t_irwin','davidirwin',x'61b6a47d0ab0894bca8bdb65
8307051d9bb9f2e42e126198a1aaeca2f68658fa','echo123',130590
1540,30,2,
'<partlist alt="">
<part
identity="david_t_irwin"><name>davidirwin</name></part>
<part identity="echo123"><name>Echo / Sound Test
Service</name></part>
</partlist>',
'echo123','',2,18,2,1,1160776592,'f1676bd45b6963ef2522d976d59b361
9');”

Figure 13c – X-Ways extract of Skype VoIP call setup to Sound Test Service
The use of a programmed search algorithm is more efficient than a visible
search. A number of possible segments of human speech have been identified
based on amplitude and symmetry and displayed on a single graph for the user
to visually inspect for the difference between a pure or amplitude-modulated
sinusoidal trace and that typical of human speech. This reduces the search
space of a RAM capture to a single point of investigative analysis but none the
less still requires human intervention in the form of visual inspection. Table 3
indicates the number of suspect audio fragments detected from each VoIP call.
Table 3 – VoIP call to Skype Test Call Centre made from inside virtual
machine.
RAM
Capture
1
2
3

Detection
Method
Automatic algorithm
Automatic algorithm
Automatic algorithm

VoIP
Call
Skype
Skype
Skype

Expected
outcome
dialing tone,
automated voice
&
caller’s voice
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Actual
outcome
sinusoids &
suspect
human voice

Byte
size
4096
4096
4096

Segments
48
46
53
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It would not be an unreasonable question to ask 'why use the capture of
memory for the purpose of obtaining audio, why not just capture the
microphone input or speaker output directly'?
The capture of computer memory allows information to be retrieved including
specific information relating to the use of VoIP applications, such as call
identifiers, user names, date and timestamps, the captured information may
subsequently be used to testify to the authenticity of such a call having been
made.
The test of a known audio dissected into five segments of equal audio length
and inserted into the RAM capture as outlined in 2.1 yielded all five segments
being detected. Five segments are easily re-assembled into its original form
visually. However, the amount of audio segments recovered from the VoIP
call are significant and potentially three distinct sources, the VoIP application
dialling tone, the automated answering of the call to the Skype test sound
service and the caller.
Dialling tones are easily identified using a signal processing technique called
frequency domain analysis. A brief introduction to digital signal processing is
discussed in section three however the removal of dialling tone still requires
two separate call stream to be identified. This requires an additional algorithm
to interrogate the start and ending bytes of each segment retrieved and attempt
to find another once with which matches to form two separate streams of
continuous audio.
Similarly, one may ask the question “why focus on a RAM capture, without
extending the search to a hard disk(s) as the contents of RAM are continually
being swapped out from virtual memory to physical memory stored on the
hard disk(s). The answer is simple; it wasn’t within the remit of the Law
Enforcement Agency to require analysis of anything other than a perceived
RAM capture represented as a file with a ‘.txt’ extension. However, the
analysis techniques described in this research are easily extended to include
analysis of the hard disk(s) and information and files related to the transfer of
virtual memory pages to a physical location.
3. INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING
Although information stored in RAM is paged in Windows operating systems,
the information within each page e.g. a fragment of human speech is ordered
sequentially in time. Therefore all research until now has taken place in the
time domain with graphical plots of signal samples on the y-axis appear as
how they are digitised in time in memory. The main research theme is to
demonstrate the ongoing development of an automatic audio search
functionality to identify the fragments of human speech.
Having identified a series of signal components from the RAM capture which
exhibit a symmetrical pattern (Figure 13b) based on simple characteristics of
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human speech displayed in Figures 9 and 11, one can further remove
composite sinusoidal signals unrelated to human speech by processing the
sampling values through a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and viewing the
result in the frequency domain.
A FFT is itself an algorithm for calculating the Discrete Fourier Transform
(DFT) which decomposes a sequence of values, in this case, amplitudes of
suspected audio fragments into components of different frequencies.
For the purpose of drawing comparison, how do other files such as word
documents or excel worksheets appear when graphically displayed in the time
domain. The technique employed displaying the file on 50 graphs where each
graph displays 4096 byes. Each graph has a different starting point within the
file, e.g. graph 1 (top row, 1st column) starts at 0 bytes and displays the first
4096 bytes and graph 2 (top row, 2nd column) starts at 1/50th of the file length
and displays the next 4096 bytes. This process is repeated for the fifty graphs,
and with one click of a button, all graphs advance 4096 bytes. The word
document shown in Figure 14 was visually inspected and contained no
similarities to composite sinusoids or audio fragments.

Figure 14 – Visual display of byte values for a word document.
Based on the above visual inspection, no audio-like byte segments are
detected and subsequently would not be passed to the frequency domain for
analysis. Note that the document tested and one you are reading are the same
document.
Similarly for an excel document, the document tested was the one containing
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the power spectrum plots and sinusoids and suspected audio fragments. Once
again a visual inspection of the file contents displayed as a graphical plot of
the bytes making up the file revealed no audio like fragments.
The visual inspection of graphical memory displayed in Figure 14 was
laborious and the first step in searching for audio like fragments to determine
their properties for automatic algorithm development.
3.1 Power Spectrum Analysis in the Frequency Domain
For the purpose of this research, the programming code for the FFT has been
extracted (and manipulated to suit) from Audacity (2011), a free crossplatform audio editor developed by a team of software developers, translators,
documentation writers. The Audacity application contains the function “Plot
Spectrum”, which analyses a section of audio and converts it to a graph of
frequencies against amplitudes using the FFT algorithm to provide a value for
each narrow band of frequencies that represents how much of those
frequencies are present. This research is based upon the code contained in the
Audacity “Plot Spectrum” function to analyse the portions of RAM capture,
which are suspected of being fragments of audio.
The term, aliasing, is used to describe the effect of different signals becoming
indistinguishable from each other. To counter the effect of aliasing, the FFT is
used in conjunction with a Hann Window function, to process the suspected
audio fragments in the time domain. The code for the Hann Window function
is also extracted from Audacity, which allows a smaller subset of the
suspected audio to be analysed, just as the name infers, applying an
overlapping window, which traverses the original FFT input to produce the
corresponding frequency domain output.
The composite sinusoidal signal shown in Figure 10 produces a frequency
domain plot as shown in Figure 15, highlighting its composition from more
than one frequency. A periodic sinusoid would display as a single frequency
component in the frequency domain.
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Sinusoidal Power Spectrum
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Figure 15 - Frequency domain analysis (x-axis: Frequency (Hz), y-axis: Raw
amplitude)
The FFT transforms the time domain signal into a frequency domain
representation of that signal. It generates a description of the distribution of
the energy in the signal as a function of frequency. The vocal range of human
speech varies from approximately 70 Hz to 7 KHz. However, most of the
information conveyed in human speech does not exceed 4 KHz.
The modelling of human speech and the pronunciation of vowels, shown
below in Figure 16 indicates that the majority of the energy is concentrated
below 4 KHz.
Three different vocal tract shapes are shown corresponding, from top to
bottom, to the vowels "ah" (/a/), "ee" (/i/), and "oo" (/u/). Plotted in the same
graph for each tract shape is the spectrum. Note all three vowels have
differing spectra due to the different vocal tract shapes. A variety of methods
are being used to explore this mapping (Kawato, 1989; Saltzman, Munhall,
1989; Jordan, 1990).
Nyquist’s theorem states that the sampling frequency must be at least twice as
high as the highest input frequency (4 KHz) thus a sampling frequency of 8
KHz will allow the digitised voice to correctly represent the original signal. A
pure sinusoid in the frequency domain will appear as a single spike, whereas
the signal shown has 2 spikes at similar frequencies (440 Hz and 485 Hz) and
also have a mirror image of itself (7515 Hz and 7560 Hz), with even
symmetry around the centre point of half the sampling frequency, 4 KHz.
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Figure 16 – Energy distribution versus frequency of human speech.
The phenomenon of reflection around the point of half the sampling frequency
for periodic signals is counteracted by the software via automatically
removing the part of the spectrum for frequencies exceeding half of the
sampling frequency. The resulting spectrum can now be compared against
frequency domain plots of sections of human speech where most of the energy
is concentrated below 4 KHz e.g. as shown in Figure 17. Signals that do not
fall within the range of pattern representing human speech can therefore be
removed.
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Figure 17 - Frequency domain analysis of speech (x-axis: Frequency (Hz), yaxis: Raw amplitude)

79

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(3)
The resulting collection of signals that remain after the removal of non-speech
signals based on both time domain and frequency domain analysis are
believed to be fragments of human speech which have been digitised after
processing by the sound card.
4. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
The techniques described in this research have been applied only to RAM
captures. The RAM captures discussed in experimental setup have been
forensically acquired using X-Ways Forensics. The research has aimed to
introduce novel techniques for the analysis of physical memory such as
graphical visualisation (albeit time consuming) and the development of
automatic algorithms to identify possible audio fragments based on their
symmetrical appearance.
The use of visual inspection aimed to review the full RAM capture visually to
avoid developing an algorithm that would detect false positives and omit false
negatives. This was aided by the introduction of known segments into the
RAM capture out with a VoIP call to test the detection properties of the
algorithms.
The use of digital signal processing techniques to view possible audio
fragments in the frequency domain is also novel. However, this research is
ongoing to develop further algorithms that will inspect the leading and trailing
edges of the suspect audio fragments to see if they can be joined together to
identify different call streams and form continuous segments of audio.
Once segments of continuous audio have been reconstructed, it is anticipated
that they would provide a high degree of probability that a particular
individual has had access to a specific computer and made a VoIP call by
matching their voice against the recovered audio from memory.
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